The capture of Jamaica by the expedition sent out
by Cromwell in 1655 was the blundering beginning
of a new era in West Indian history. It was
the first permanent annexation by another European
power of an integral part of Spanish America. Before
1655 the island had already been twice visited by English
forces. The first occasion was in January 1597, when
Sir Anthony Shirley, with little opposition, took and
plundered St. Jago de la Vega. The second was in 1643,
when William Jackson repeated the same exploit with
500 men from the Windward Islands. Cromwell's expedition,
consisting of 2500 men and a considerable fleet, set
sail from England in December 1654, with the secret
object of "gaining an interest" in that part of the West
Indies in possession of the Spaniards. Admiral Penn
commanded the fleet, and General Venables the land
forces.119
The expedition reached Barbadoes at the end of
January, where some 4000 additional troops were raised,
{86}
besides about 1200 from Nevis, St. Kitts, and neighbouring
islands. The commanders having resolved to direct their
first attempt against Hispaniola, on 13th April a landing
was effected at a point to the west of San Domingo, and
the army, suffering terribly from a tropical sun and lack
of water, marched thirty miles through woods and
savannahs to attack the city. The English received two
shameful defeats from a handful of Spaniards on 17th and
25th April, and General Venables, complaining loudly of
the cowardice of his men and of Admiral Penn's failure
to co-operate with him, finally gave up the attempt and
sailed for Jamaica. On 11th May, in the splendid harbour
on which Kingston now stands, the English fleet dropped
anchor. Three small forts on the western side were
battered by the guns from the ships, and as soon as the
troops began to land the garrisons evacuated their posts.
St. Jago, six miles inland, was occupied next day. The
terms offered by Venables to the Spaniards (the same as
those exacted from the English settlers on Providence
Island in 1641—emigration within ten days on pain of
death, and forfeiture of all their property) were accepted on
the 17th; but the Spaniards were soon discovered to have
entered into negotiations merely to gain time and retire
with their families and goods to the woods and mountains,
whence they continued their resistance. Meanwhile the
army, wretchedly equipped with provisions and other
necessities, was decimated by sickness. On the 19th
two long-expected store-ships arrived, but the supplies
brought by them were limited, and an appeal for assistance
was sent to New England. Admiral Penn, disgusted
with the fiasco in Hispaniola and on bad terms with
Venables, sailed for England with part of his fleet on
25th June; and Venables, so ill that his life was despaired
of, and also anxious to clear himself of the responsibility
for the initial failure of the expedition, followed in the
{87}
"Marston Moor" nine days later. On 20th September both
commanders appeared before the Council of State to
answer the charge of having deserted their posts, and together
they shared the disgrace of a month in the Tower.120
The army of General Venables was composed of very
inferior and undisciplined troops, mostly the rejected of
English regiments or the offscourings of the West Indian
colonies; yet the chief reasons for the miscarriage before
San Domingo were the failure of Venables to command
the confidence of his officers and men, his inexcusable
errors in the management of the attack, and the lack of
cordial co-operation between him and the Admiral. The
difficulties with which he had to struggle were, of course,
very great. On the other hand, he seems to have been
deficient both in strength of character and in military
capacity; and his ill-health made still more difficult a
task for which he was fundamentally incompetent. The
comparative failure of this, Cromwell's pet enterprise, was
a bitter blow to the Protector. For a whole day he shut
himself up in his room, brooding over the disaster for
which he, more than any other, was responsible. He had
aimed not merely to plant one more colony in America,
but to make himself master of such parts of the West
Indian islands and Spanish Main as would enable him to
dominate the route of the Spanish-American treasure
fleets. To this end Jamaica contributed few advantages
beyond those possessed by Barbadoes and St. Kitts, and
it was too early for him to realize that island for island
Jamaica was much more suitable than Hispaniola as the
seat of an English colony.121
Religious and economic motives form the key to
Cromwell's foreign policy, and it is difficult to discover
{88}
which, the religious or the economic, was uppermost in
his mind when he planned this expedition. He inherited
from the Puritans of Elizabeth's time the traditional
religious hatred of Spain as the bulwark of Rome, and
in his mind as in theirs the overthrow of the Spaniards
in the West Indies was a blow at antichrist and an
extension of the true religion. The religious ends of
the expedition were fully impressed upon Venables and
his successors in Jamaica.122
Second only, however, to
Oliver's desire to protect "the people of God," was his
ambition to extend England's empire beyond the seas.
He desired the unquestioned supremacy of England
over the other nations of Europe, and that supremacy,
as he probably foresaw, was to be commercial and
colonial. Since the discovery of America the world's
commerce had enormously increased, and its control
brought with it national power. America had become
the treasure-house of Europe. If England was to be set
at the head of the world's commerce and navigation,
she must break through Spain's monopoly of the Indies
and gain a control in Spanish America. San Domingo
was to be but a preliminary step, after which the rest
of the Spanish dominions in the New World would be
gradually absorbed.123
The immediate excuse for the attack on Hispaniola
and Jamaica was the Spaniards' practice of seizing
English ships and ill-treating English crews merely because
they were found in some part of the Caribbean
Sea, and even though bound for a plantation actually in
possession of English colonists. It was the old question
of effective occupation versus papal donation, and both
{89}
Cromwell and Venables convinced themselves that
Spanish assaults in the past on English ships and
colonies supplied a sufficient casus belli.124
There was no
justification, however, for a secret attack upon Spain.
She had been the first to recognize the young republic,
and was willing and even anxious to league herself
with England. There had been actual negotiations for
an alliance, and Cromwell's offers, though rejected, had
never been really withdrawn. Without a declaration
of war or formal notice of any sort, a fleet was fitted
out and sent in utmost secrecy to fall unawares upon
the colonies of a friendly nation. The whole aspect
of the exploit was Elizabethan. It was inspired by
Drake and Raleigh, a reversion to the Elizabethan
gold-hunt. It was the first of the great buccaneering
expeditions.125
Cromwell was doubtless influenced, too, by the
representations of Thomas Gage. Gage was an Englishman
who had joined the Dominicans and had been
sent by his Order out to Spanish America. In 1641
he returned to England, announced his conversion to
Protestantism, took the side of Parliament and became
a minister. His experiences in the West Indies and
Mexico he published in 1648 under the name of "The
English-American, or a New Survey of the West
Indies," a most entertaining book, which aimed to
arouse Englishmen against Romish "idolatries," to show
how valuable the Spanish-American provinces might
be to England in trade and bullion and how easily
they might be seized. In the summer of 1654, moreover,
Gage had laid before the Protector a memorial in
which he recapitulated the conclusions of his book,
assuring Cromwell that the Spanish colonies were
sparsely peopled and that the few whites were unwarlike
and scantily provided with arms and ammunition. He
asserted that the conquest of Hispaniola and Cuba
would be a matter of no difficulty, and that even Central
America was too weak to oppose a long resistance.126
All this was true, and had Cromwell but sent a respectable
force under an efficient leader the result
would have been different. The exploits of the
buccaneers a few years later proved it.
It was fortunate, considering the distracted state
of affairs in Jamaica in 1655-56, that the Spaniards were
in no condition to attempt to regain the island. Cuba,
the nearest Spanish territory to Jamaica, was being
ravaged by the most terrible pestilence known there
in years, and the inhabitants, alarmed for their own
safety, instead of trying to dispossess the English, were
{91}
busy providing for the defence of their own coasts.127
In 1657,
however, some troops under command of the old Spanish
governor of Jamaica, D. Christopher Sasi Arnoldo, crossed
from St. Jago de Cuba and entrenched themselves on the
northern shore as the advance post of a greater force expected
from the mainland. Papers of instructions relating to
the enterprise were intercepted by Colonel Doyley, then
acting-governor of Jamaica; and he with 500 picked men
embarked for the north side, attacked the Spaniards in their
entrenchments and utterly routed them.128
The next year
about 1000 men, the long-expected corps of regular Spanish
infantry, landed and erected a fort at Rio Nuevo. Doyley,
displaying the same energy, set out again on 11th June
with 750 men, landed under fire on the 22nd, and next
day captured the fort in a brilliant attack in which about
300 Spaniards were killed and 100 more, with many
officers and flags, captured. The English lost about
sixty in killed and wounded.129
After the failure of a
similar, though weaker, attempt in 1660, the Spaniards
despaired of regaining Jamaica, and most of those still
upon the island embraced the first opportunity to retire
to Cuba and other Spanish settlements.
As colonists the troops in Jamaica proved to be
very discouraging material, and the army was soon in
a wretched state. The officers and soldiers plundered
and mutinied instead of working and planting. Their
wastefulness led to scarcity of food, and scarcity of food
brought disease and death.130
They wished to force the
{92}
Protector to recall them, or to employ them in assaulting
the opulent Spanish towns on the Main, an occupation
far more lucrative than that of planting corn and provisions
for sustenance. Cromwell, however, set himself
to develop and strengthen his new colony. He issued
a proclamation encouraging trade and settlement in the
island by exempting the inhabitants from taxes, and
the Council voted that 1000 young men and an equal
number of girls be shipped over from Ireland. The
Scotch government was instructed to apprehend and
transport idlers and vagabonds, and commissioners were
sent into New England and to the Windward and Leeward
Islands to try and attract settlers.131
Bermudians,
Jews, Quakers from Barbadoes and criminals from Newgate,
helped to swell the population of the new colony,
and in 1658 the island is said to have contained 4500
whites, besides 1500 or more negro slaves.132
To dominate the Spanish trade routes was one of the
principal objects of English policy in the West Indies.
This purpose is reflected in all of Cromwell's instructions
to the leaders of the Jamaican design, and it appears again
in his instructions of 10th October 1655 to Major-General
Fortescue and Vice-Admiral Goodson. Fortescue was
given power and authority to land men upon territory
claimed by the Spaniards, to take their forts, castles and
places of strength, and to pursue, kill and destroy all who
opposed him. The Vice-Admiral was to assist him with
his sea-forces, and to use his best endeavours to seize all
{93}
ships belonging to the King of Spain or his subjects in
America.133
The soldiers, as has been said, were more
eager to fight the Spaniards than to plant, and opportunities
were soon given them to try their hand. Admiral
Penn had left twelve ships under Goodson's charge, and
of these, six were at sea picking up a few scattered Spanish
prizes which helped to pay for the victuals supplied out of
New England.134
Goodson, however, was after larger prey,
no less than the galleons or a Spanish town upon the
mainland. He did not know where the galleons were,
but at the end of July he seems to have been lying with
eight vessels before Cartagena and Porto Bello, and on
22nd November he sent Captain Blake with nine ships to
the same coast to intercept all vessels going thither from
Spain or elsewhere. The fleet was broken up by foul
weather, however, and part returned on 14th December
to refit, leaving a few small frigates to lie in wait for some
merchantmen reported to be in that region.135
The first
town on the Main to feel the presence of this new power
in the Indies was Santa Marta, close to Cartagena on the
shores of what is now the U.S. of Columbia. In the
latter part of October, just a month before the departure
of Blake, Goodson sailed with a fleet of eight vessels to
ravage the Spanish coasts. According to one account his
original design had been against Rio de la Hacha near
the pearl fisheries, "but having missed his aim" he sailed
for Santa Marta. He landed 400 sailors and soldiers
under the protection of his guns, took and demolished the
two forts which barred his way, and entered the town.
Finding that the inhabitants had already fled with as
much of their belongings as they could carry, he pursued
{94}
them some twelve miles up into the country; and on his
return plundered and burnt their houses, embarked with
thirty pieces of cannon and other booty, and sailed for
Jamaica.136
It was a gallant performance with a handful
of men, but the profits were much less than had been
expected. It had been agreed that the seamen and
soldiers should receive half the spoil, but on counting the
proceeds it was found that their share amounted to no
more than £400, to balance which the State took the
thirty pieces of ordnance and some powder, shot, hides,
salt and Indian corn.137
Sedgwick wrote to Thurloe that
"reckoning all got there on the State's share, it did not
pay for the powder and shot spent in that service."138
Sedgwick was one of the civil commissioners appointed
for the government of Jamaica. A brave, pious soldier
with a long experience and honourable military record in
the Massachusetts colony, he did not approve of this type
of warfare against the Spaniards. "This kind of marooning
cruising West India trade of plundering and burning
towns," he writes, "though it hath been long practised in
these parts, yet is not honourable for a princely navy,
neither was it, I think, the work designed, though perhaps
it may be tolerated at present." If Cromwell was to
accomplish his original purpose of blocking up the Spanish
treasure route, he wrote again, permanent foothold must
be gained in some important Spanish fortress, either
Cartagena or Havana, places strongly garrisoned, however,
and requiring for their reduction a considerable army and
fleet, such as Jamaica did not then possess. But to waste
and burn towns of inferior rank without retaining them
merely dragged on the war indefinitely and effected little
advantage or profit to anybody.139
Captain Nuberry
{95}
visited Santa Marta several weeks after Goodson's descent,
and, going on shore, found that about a hundred people had
made bold to return and rebuild their devastated homes.
Upon sight of the English the poor people again fled
incontinently to the woods, and Nuberry and his men
destroyed their houses a second time.140
On 5th April 1656 Goodson, with ten of his best ships,
set sail again and steered eastward along the coast of
Hispaniola as far as Alta Vela, hoping to meet with some
Spanish ships reported in that region. Encountering
none, he stood for the Main, and landed on 4th May with
about 450 men at Rio de la Hacha. The story of the
exploit is merely a repetition of what happened at Santa
Marta. The people had sight of the English fleet six
hours before it could drop anchor, and fled from the town
to the hills and surrounding woods. Only twelve men
were left behind to hold the fort, which the English stormed
and took within half an hour. Four large brass cannon
were carried to the ships and the fort partly demolished.
The Spaniards pretended to parley for the ransom of their
town, but when after a day's delay they gave no sign of
complying with the admiral's demands, he burned the place
on 8th May and sailed away.141
Goodson called again at
Santa Marta on the 11th to get water, and on the 14th
stood before Cartagena to view the harbour. Leaving
three vessels to ply there, he returned to Jamaica, bringing
back with him only two small prizes, one laden with wine,
the other with cocoa.
The seamen of the fleet, however, were restless and
eager for further enterprises of this nature, and Goodson
by the middle of June had fourteen of his vessels lying off
the Cuban coast near Cape S. Antonio in wait for the
galleons or the Flota, both of which fleets were then
expected at Havana. His ambition to repeat the achievement
{96}
of Piet Heyn was fated never to be realised. The
fleet of Terra-Firma, he soon learned, had sailed into
Havana on 15th May, and on 13th June, three days before
his arrival on that coast, had departed for Spain.142
Meanwhile,
one of his own vessels, the "Arms of Holland," was
blown up, with the loss of all on board but three men and
the captain, and two other ships were disabled. Five of
the fleet returned to England on 23rd August, and with
the rest Goodson remained on the Cuban coast until the
end of the month, watching in vain for the fleet from
Vera Cruz which never sailed.143
Colonel Edward Doyley, the officer who so promptly
defeated the attempts of the Spaniards in 1657-58 to
re-conquer Jamaica, was now governor of the island. He
had sailed with the expedition to the West Indies as
lieutenant-colonel in the regiment of General Venables,
and on the death of Major-General Fortescue in November
1655 had been chosen by Cromwell's commissioners in
Jamaica as commander-in-chief of the land forces. In
May 1656 he was superseded by Robert Sedgwick, but
the latter died within a few days, and Doyley petitioned
the Protector to appoint him to the post. William Brayne,
however, arrived from England in December 1656 to take
chief command; and when he, like his two predecessors,
was stricken down by disease nine months later, the place
devolved permanently upon Doyley. Doyley was a very
efficient governor, and although he has been accused of
showing little regard or respect for planting and trade, the
{97}
charge appears to be unjust.144
He firmly maintained order
among men disheartened and averse to settlement, and at
the end of his service delivered up the colony a comparatively
well-ordered and thriving community. He was
confirmed in his post by Charles II. at the Restoration, but
superseded by Lord Windsor in August 1661. Doyley's
claim to distinction rests mainly upon his vigorous policy
against the Spaniards, not only in defending Jamaica, but
by encouraging privateers and carrying the war into the
enemies' quarters. In July 1658, on learning from some
prisoners that the galleons were in Porto Bello awaiting
the plate from Panama, Doyley embarked 300 men on a
fleet of five vessels and sent it to lie in an obscure bay
between that port and Cartagena to intercept the Spanish
ships. On 20th October the galleons were espied, twenty-nine
vessels in all, fifteen galleons and fourteen stout
merchantmen. Unfortunately, all the English vessels
except the "Hector" and the "Marston Moor" were at
that moment absent to obtain fresh water. Those two
alone could do nothing, but passing helplessly through the
Spaniards, hung on their rear and tried without success to
scatter them. The English fleet later attacked and burnt
the town of Tolu on the Main, capturing two Spanish
ships in the road; and afterwards paid another visit to
the unfortunate Santa Marta, where they remained three
days, marching several miles into the country and burning
and destroying everything in their path.145
On 23rd April 1659, however, there returned to Port
Royal another expedition whose success realised the
wildest dreams of avarice. Three frigates under command
{98}
of Captain Christopher Myngs,146
with 300 soldiers on
board, had been sent by Doyley to harry the South
American coast. They first entered and destroyed
Cumana, and then ranging along the coast westward,
landed again at Puerto Cabello and at Coro. At the
latter town they followed the inhabitants into the woods,
where besides other plunder they came upon twenty-two
chests of royal treasure intended for the King of Spain,
each chest containing 400 pounds of silver.147
Embarking
this money and other spoil in the shape of plate, jewels
and cocoa, they returned to Port Royal with the richest
prize that ever entered Jamaica. The whole pillage was
estimated at between £200,000 and £300,000.148
The
abundance of new wealth introduced into Jamaica did much
to raise the spirits of the colonists, and set the island well
upon the road to more prosperous times. The sequel to
this brilliant exploit, however, was in some ways unfortunate.
Disputes were engendered between the officers of the
expedition and the governor and other authorities on
shore over the disposal of the booty, and in the early part
of June 1659 Captain Myngs was sent home in the
"Marston Moor," suspended for disobeying orders and
plundering the hold of one of the prizes to the value of
12,000 pieces of eight. Myngs was an active, intrepid
commander, but apparently avaricious and impatient of
{99}
control. He seems to have endeavoured to divert most
of the prize money into the pockets of his officers and men,
by disposing of the booty on his own initiative before
giving a strict account of it to the governor or steward-general
of the island. Doyley writes that there was a
constant market aboard the "Marston Moor," and that
Myngs and his officers, alleging it to be customary to break
and plunder the holds, permitted the twenty-two chests of
the King of Spain's silver to be divided among the men
without any provision whatever for the claims of the State.149
There was also some friction over the disposal of six Dutch
prizes which Doyley had picked up for illegal trading at
Barbadoes on his way out from England. These, too, had
been plundered before they reached Jamaica, and when
Myngs found that there was no power in the colony to try
and condemn ships taken by virtue of the Navigation Laws,
it only added fuel to his dissatisfaction. When Myngs
reached England he lodged counter-complaints against
Governor Doyley, Burough, the steward-general, and Vice-Admiral
Goodson, alleging that they received more than
their share of the prize money; and a war of mutual
recrimination followed.150
Amid the distractions of the
Restoration, however, little seems ever to have been made
of the matter in England. The insubordination of officers
in 1659-60 was a constant source of difficulty and impediment
to the governor in his efforts to establish peace and
order in the colony. In England nobody was sure where
the powers of government actually resided. As Burough
wrote from Jamaica on 19th January 1660, "We are here
just like you at home; when we heard of the Lord-Protector's
{100}
death we proclaimed his son, and when we
heard of his being turned out we proclaimed a Parliament
and now own a Committee of safety."151
The effect of this
uncertainty was bound to be prejudicial in Jamaica, a new
colony filled with adventurers, for it loosened the reins of
authority and encouraged lawless spirits to set the governor
at defiance.
On 8th May 1660 Charles II. was proclaimed King of
England, and entered London on 29th May. The war
which Cromwell had begun with Spain was essentially a
war of the Commonwealth. The Spanish court was
therefore on friendly terms with the exiled prince, and
when he returned into possession of his kingdom a
cessation of hostilities with Spain naturally followed.
Charles wrote a note to Don Luis de Haro on 2nd June
1660, proposing an armistice in Europe and America
which was to lead to a permanent peace and a re-establishment
of commercial relations between the two kingdoms.152
At the same time Sir Henry Bennett, the English resident
in Madrid, made similar proposals to the Spanish king.
A favourable answer was received in July, and the cessation
of arms, including a revival of the treaty of 1630
was proclaimed on 10th-20th September 1660. Preliminary
negotiations for a new treaty were entered upon at
Madrid, but the marriage of Charles to Catherine of
Braganza in 1662, and the consequent alliance with
Portugal, with whom Spain was then at war, put a
damper upon all such designs. The armistice with Spain
was not published in Jamaica until 5th February of the
following year. On 4th February Colonel Doyley received
from the governor of St. Jago de Cuba a letter enclosing
an order from Sir Henry Bennett for the cessation of
arms, and this order Doyley immediately made public.153
{101}
About thirty English prisoners were also returned by the
Spaniards with the letter. Doyley was confirmed in his
command of Jamaica by Charles II., but his commission
was not issued till 8th February 1661.154
He was very
desirous, however, of returning to England to look after
his private affairs, and on 2nd August another commission
was issued to Lord Windsor, appointing him as Doyley's
successor.155
Just a year later, in August 1662, Windsor
arrived at Port Royal, fortified with instructions "to
endeavour to obtain and preserve a good correspondence
and free commerce with the plantations belonging to the
King of Spain," even resorting to force if necessary.156
The question of English trade with the Spanish
colonies in the Indies had first come to the surface in the
negotiations for the treaty of 1604, after the long wars
between Elizabeth and Philip II. The endeavour of the
Spaniards to obtain an explicit prohibition of commerce
was met by the English demand for entire freedom. The
Spaniards protested that it had never been granted in
former treaties or to other nations, or even without
restriction to Spanish subjects, and clamoured for at least
a private article on the subject; but the English commissioners
steadfastly refused, and offered to forbid trade
only with ports actually under Spanish authority. Finally
a compromise was reached in the words "in quibus ante
bellum fuit commercium, juxta et secundum usum et
observantiam."157
This article was renewed in Cottington's
{102}
Treaty of 1630. The Spaniards themselves, indeed, in
1630, were willing to concede a free navigation in the
American seas, and even offered to recognise the English
colony of Virginia if Charles I. would admit articles prohibiting
trade and navigation in certain harbours and
bays. Cottington, however, was too far-sighted, and
wrote to Lord Dorchester: "For my own part, I shall
ever be far from advising His Majesty to think of such
restrictions, for certainly a little more time will open the
navigation to those parts so long as there are no negative
capitulations or articles to hinder it."158
The monopolistic
pretensions of the Spanish government were evidently
relaxing, for in 1634 the Conde de Humanes confided to
the English agent, Taylor, that there had been talk in
the Council of the Indies of admitting the English to a
share in the freight of ships sent to the West Indies, and
even of granting them a limited permission to go to those
regions on their own account. And in 1637 the Conde de
Linhares, recently appointed governor of Brazil, told the
English ambassador, Lord Aston, that he was very
anxious that English ships should do the carrying between
Lisbon and Brazilian ports.
The settlement of the Windward and Leeward Islands
and the conquest of Jamaica had given a new impetus to
contraband trade. The commercial nations were setting
up shop, as it were, at the very doors of the Spanish
Indies. The French and English Antilles, condemned
by the Navigation Laws to confine themselves to agriculture
and a passive trade with the home country, had no recourse
but to traffic with their Spanish neighbours.
{103}
Factors of the Assiento established at Cartagena, Porto
Bello and Vera Cruz every year supplied European
merchants with detailed news of the nature and quantity
of the goods which might be imported with advantage;
while the buccaneers, by dominating the whole Caribbean
Sea, hindered frequent communication between Spain and
her colonies. It is not surprising, therefore, that the
commerce of Seville, which had hitherto held its own,
decreased with surprising rapidity, that the sailings of the
galleons and the Flota were separated by several years,
and that the fairs of Porto Bello and Vera Cruz were
almost deserted. To put an effective restraint, moreover,
upon this contraband trade was impossible on either side.
The West Indian dependencies were situated far from
the centre of authority, while the home governments
generally had their hands too full of other matters to
adequately control their subjects in America. The
Spanish viceroys, meanwhile, and the governors in the
West Indian Islands, connived at a practice which lined
their own pockets with the gold of bribery, and at the
same time contributed to the public interest and prosperity
of their respective colonies. It was this illicit commerce
with Spanish America which Charles II., by negotiation at
Madrid and by instructions to his governors in the West
Indies, tried to get within his own control. At the
Spanish court, Fanshaw, Sandwich and Godolphin in turn
were instructed to sue for a free trade with the Colonies.
The Assiento of negroes was at this time held by two
Genoese named Grillo and Lomelin, and with them the
English ambassadors several times entered into negotiation
for the privilege of supplying blacks from the English
islands. By the treaty of 1670 the English colonies in
America were for the first time formally recognised by the
Spanish Crown. Freedom of commerce, however, was as
far as ever from realisation, and after this date Charles
{104}
seems to have given up hope of ever obtaining it through
diplomatic channels.
The peace of 1660 between England and Spain was
supposed to extend to both sides of the "Line." The
Council in Jamaica, however, were of the opinion that it
applied only to Europe,159
and from the tenor of Lord
Windsor's instructions it may be inferred that the English
Court at that time meant to interpret it with the same
limitations. Windsor, indeed, was not only instructed to
force the Spanish colonies to a free trade, but was empowered
to call upon the governor of Barbadoes for aid
"in case of any considerable attempt by the Spaniards
against Jamaica."160
The efforts of the Governor, however,
to come to a good correspondence with the Spanish
colonies were fruitless. In the minutes of the Council of
Jamaica of 20th August 1662, we read: "Resolved that the
letters from the Governors of Porto Rico and San Domingo
are an absolute denial of trade, and that according to His
Majesty's instructions to Lord Windsor a trade by force
or otherwise be endeavoured;"161
and under 12th September
we find another resolution "that men be enlisted for
a design by sea with the 'Centurion' and other vessels."162
This "design" was an expedition to capture and destroy
St. Jago de Cuba, the Spanish port nearest to Jamaican
shores. An attack upon St. Jago had been projected by
Goodson as far back as 1655. "The Admiral," wrote
Major Sedgwick to Thurloe just after his arrival in
Jamaica, "was intended before our coming in to have
taken some few soldiers and gone over to St. Jago de
Cuba, a town upon Cuba, but our coming hindered him
without whom we could not well tell how to do anything."163
In January 1656 the plan was definitely abandoned, because
{105}
the colony could not spare a sufficient number of
soldiers for the enterprise.164
It was to St. Jago that the
Spaniards, driven from Jamaica, mostly betook themselves,
and from St. Jago as a starting-point had come the expedition
of 1658 to reconquer the island. The instructions
of Lord Windsor afforded a convenient opportunity to
avenge past attacks and secure Jamaica from molestation
in that quarter for the future. The command of the expedition
was entrusted to Myngs, who in 1662 was again
in the Indies on the frigate "Centurion." Myngs sailed
from Port Royal on 21st September with eleven ships and
1300 men,165
but, kept back by unfavourable winds, did not
sight the castle of St. Jago until 5th October. Although
he had intended to force the entrance of the harbour, he
was prevented by the prevailing land breeze; so he disembarked
his men to windward, on a rocky coast, where the
path up the bluffs was so narrow that but one man could
march at a time. Night had fallen before all were landed,
and "the way (was) soe difficult and the night soe dark
that they were forced to make stands and fires, and their
guides with brands in their hands, to beat the path."166
At
daybreak they reached a plantation by a river's side, some
six miles from the place of landing and three from St.
Jago. There they refreshed themselves, and advancing
upon the town surprised the enemy, who knew of the late
landing and the badness of the way and did not expect
them so soon. They found 200 Spaniards at the entrance
to the town, drawn up under their governor, Don Pedro
de Moralis, and supported by Don Christopher de Sasi
Arnoldo, the former Spanish governor of Jamaica, with a
reserve of 500 more. The Spaniards fled before the first
charge of the Jamaicans, and the place was easily mastered.
The next day parties were despatched into the country
to pursue the enemy, and orders sent to the fleet to attack
the forts at the mouth of the harbour. This was successfully
done, the Spaniards deserting the great castle after
firing but two muskets. Between scouring the country
for hidden riches, most of which had been carried far
inland beyond their reach, and dismantling and demolishing
the forts, the English forces occupied their time until
October 19th. Thirty-four guns were found in the fortifications
and 1000 barrels of powder. Some of the guns were
carried to the ships and the rest flung over the precipice
into the sea; while the powder was used to blow up the
castle and the neighbouring country houses.167
The expedition
returned to Jamaica on 22nd October.168
Only
six men had been killed by the Spaniards, twenty more
being lost by other "accidents." Of these twenty some
must have been captured by the enemy, for when Sir
Richard Fanshaw was appointed ambassador to Spain in
January 1664, he was instructed among other things to
negotiate for an exchange of prisoners taken in the Indies.
In July we find him treating for the release of Captain
Myngs' men from the prisons of Seville and Cadiz,169
and
on 7th November an order to this effect was obtained
from the King of Spain.170
The instructions of Lord Windsor gave him leave,
as soon as he had settled the government in Jamaica, to
appoint a deputy and return to England to confer with the
King on colonial affairs. Windsor sailed for England on
28th October, and on the same day Sir Charles Lyttleton's
commission as deputy-governor was read in the Jamaican
Council.171
During his short sojourn of three months the
{107}
Governor had made considerable progress toward establishing
an ordered constitution in the island. He disbanded
the old army, and reorganised the military under a stricter
discipline and better officers. He systematised legal procedure
and the rules for the conveyance of property. He
erected an Admiralty Court at Port Royal, and above all,
probably in pursuance of the recommendation of Colonel
Doyley,172
had called in all the privateering commissions
issued by previous governors, and tried to submit the
captains to orderly rules by giving them new commissions,
with instructions to bring their Spanish prizes to Jamaica
for judicature.173
The departure of Windsor did not put a stop to
the efforts of the Jamaicans to "force a trade" with the
Spanish plantations, and we find the Council, on 11th
December 1662, passing a motion that to this end an
attempt should be made to leeward on the coasts of Cuba,
Honduras and the Gulf of Campeache. On 9th and
10th January between 1500 and 1600 soldiers, many of
them doubtless buccaneers, were embarked on a fleet of
twelve ships and sailed two days later under command
of the redoubtable Myngs. About ninety leagues this
side of Campeache the fleet ran into a great storm, in
which one of the vessels foundered and three others were
separated from their fellows. The English reached the
coast of Campeache, however, in the early morning of
Friday, 9th February, and landing a league and a half
from the town, marched without being seen along an
Indian path with "such speed and good fortune" that
by ten o'clock in the morning they were already masters
of the city and of all the forts save one, the Castle of
Santa Cruz. At the second fort Myngs was wounded by
a gun in three places. The town itself, Myngs reported,
might have been defended like a fortress, for the houses
{108}
were contiguous and strongly built of stone with flat roofs.174
The forts were partly demolished, a portion of the town
was destroyed by fire, and the fourteen sail lying in the
harbour were seized by the invaders. Altogether the booty
must have been considerable. The Spanish licentiate,
Maldonado de Aldana, placed it at 150,000 pieces of eight,175
and the general damage to the city in the destruction of
houses and munitions by the enemy, and in the expenditure
of treasure for purposes of defence, at half a million more.
Myngs and his fleet sailed away on 23rd February, but the
"Centurion" did not reach Port Royal until 13th April,
and the rest of the fleet followed a few days later. The
number of casualties on each side was surprisingly small.
The invaders lost only thirty men killed, and the Spaniards
between fifty and sixty, but among the latter were the
two alcaldes and many other officers and prominent
citizens of the town.176
To satisfactorily explain at Madrid these two presumptuous
assaults upon Spanish territory in America
{109}
was an embarrassing problem for the English Government,
especially as Myngs' men imprisoned at Seville and
Cadiz were said to have produced commissions to justify
their actions.177
The Spanish king instructed his resident
in London to demand whether Charles accepted responsibility
for the attack upon St. Jago, and the proceedings of
English cases in the Spanish courts arising from the depredations
of Galician corsairs were indefinitely suspended.178
When, however, there followed upon this, in May 1663, the
news of the sack and burning of Campeache, it stirred up
the greatest excitement in Madrid.179
Orders and, what
was rarer in Spain, money were immediately sent to
Cadiz to the Duke of Albuquerque to hasten the work on
the royal Armada for despatch to the Indies; and efforts
were made to resuscitate the defunct Armada de Barlovento,
a small fleet which had formerly been used to
catch interlopers and protect the coasts of Terra-Firma.
In one way the capture of Campeache had touched Spain
in her most vulnerable spot. The Mexican Flota, which
was scheduled to sail from Havana in June 1663, refused to
stir from its retreat at Vera Cruz until the galleons from
Porto Bello came to convoy it. The arrival of the American
treasure in Spain was thus delayed for two months, and
the bankrupt government put to sore straits for money.
The activity of the Spaniards, however, was merely a
blind to hide their own impotence, and their clamours
were eventually satisfied by the King of England's writing
to Deputy-Governor Lyttleton a letter forbidding all such
undertakings for the future. The text of the letter is as
follows: "Understanding with what jealousy and offence
the Spaniards look upon our island of Jamaica, and how
disposed they are to make some attempt upon it, and
{110}
knowing how disabled it will remain in its own defence if
encouragement be given to such undertakings as have
lately been set on foot, and are yet pursued, and which
divert the inhabitants from that industry which alone can
render the island considerable, the king signifies his dislike
of all such undertakings, and commands that no such
be pursued for the future, but that they unitedly apply
themselves to the improvement of the plantation and
keeping the force in proper condition."180
The original draft
of the letter was much milder in tone, and betrays the real
attitude of Charles II. toward these half-piratical enterprises:
"His Majesty has heard of the success of the
undertaking upon Cuba, in which he cannot choose but
please himself in the vigour and resolution wherein it was
performed ... but because His Majesty cannot foresee any
utility likely to arise thereby ... he has thought fit hereby
to command him to give no encouragement to such undertakings
unless they may be performed by the frigates or
men-of-war attending that place without any addition
from the soldiers or inhabitants."181
Other letters were
subsequently sent to Jamaica, which made it clear that the
war of the privateers was not intended to be called off by
the king's instructions; and Sir Charles Lyttleton, therefore,
did not recall their commissions. Nevertheless, in the
early part of 1664, the assembly in Jamaica passed an act
prohibiting public levies of men upon foreign designs, and
forbidding any person to leave the island on any such
design without first obtaining leave from the governor,
council and assembly.182
When the instructions of the authorities at home were
so ambiguous, and the incentives to corsairing so alluring,
it was natural that this game of baiting the Spaniards
{111}
should suffer little interruption. English freebooters who
had formerly made Hispaniola and Tortuga their headquarters
now resorted to Jamaica, where they found a
cordial welcome and a better market for their plunder.
Thus in June 1663 a certain Captain Barnard sailed from
Port Royal to the Orinoco, took and plundered the town
of Santo Tomas and returned in the following March.183
On 19th October another privateer named Captain Cooper
brought into Port Royal two Spanish prizes, the larger of
which, the "Maria" of Seville, was a royal azogue and
carried 1000 quintals of quicksilver for the King of Spain's
mines in Mexico, besides oil, wine and olives.184
Cooper in
his fight with the smaller vessel so disabled his own ship
that he was forced to abandon it and enter the prize; and
it was while cruising off Hispaniola in this prize that he
fell in with the "Maria," and captured her after a four hours'
combat. There were seventy prisoners, among them a
number of friars going to Campeache and Vera Cruz.
Some of the prize goods were carried to England, and
Don Patricio Moledi, the Spanish resident in London,
importuned the English government for its restoration.185
Sir Charles Lyttleton had sailed for England on
2nd May 1664, leaving the government of Jamaica in the
hands of the Council with Colonel Thomas Lynch as
president;186
and on his arrival in England he made formal
answer to the complaints of Moledi. His excuse was that
Captain Cooper's commission had been derived not from
the deputy-governor himself but from Lord Windsor; and
that the deputy-governor had never received any order
from the king for recalling commissions, or for the
cessation of hostilities against the Spaniards.187
Lyttleton
{112}
and the English government were evidently attempting
the rather difficult circus feat of riding two mounts at the
same time. The instructions from England, as Lyttleton
himself acknowledged in his letter of 15th October 1663,
distinctly forbade further hostilities against the Spanish
plantations; on the other hand, there were no specific
orders that privateers should be recalled. Lyttleton was
from first to last in sympathy with the freebooters, and
probably believed with many others of his time that "the
Spaniard is most pliable when best beaten." In August
1664 he presented to the Lord Chancellor his reasons for
advocating a continuance of the privateers in Jamaica.
They are sufficiently interesting to merit a résumé of the
principal points advanced. 1st. Privateering maintained a
great number of seamen by whom the island was protected
without the immediate necessity of a naval force.
2nd. If privateering were forbidden, the king would lose
many men who, in case of a war in the West Indies, would
be of incalculable service, being acquainted, as they were,
with the coasts, shoals, currents, winds, etc., of the Spanish
dominions. 3rd. Without the privateers, the Jamaicans
would have no intelligence of Spanish designs against them,
or of the size or neighbourhood of their fleets, or of the
strength of their resources. 4th. If prize-goods were no
longer brought into Port Royal, few merchants would resort
to Jamaica and prices would become excessively high. 5th.
To reduce the privateers would require a large number
of frigates at considerable trouble and expense; English
seamen, moreover, generally had the privateering spirit
and would be more ready to join with them than oppose
them, as previous experience had shown. Finally, the
privateers, if denied the freedom of Jamaican ports, would
not take to planting, but would resort to the islands of
other nations, and perhaps prey upon English commerce.188
Footnote 119: (return)Venables was not bound by his instructions to any definite plan. It had been proposed, he was told, to seize Hispaniola or Porto Rico or both, after which either Cartagena or Havana might be taken, and the Spanish revenue-fleets obstructed. An alternative scheme was to make the first attempt on the mainland at some point between the mouth of the Orinoco and Porto Bello, with the ultimate object of securing Cartagena. It was left to Venables, however, to consult with Admiral Penn and three commissioners, Edward Winslow (former governor of Plymouth colony in New England), Daniel Searle (governor of Barbadoes), and Gregory Butler, as to which, if any, of these schemes should be carried out. Not until some time after the arrival of the fleet at Barbadoes was it resolved to attack Hispaniola. (Narrative of Gen. Venables, edition 1900, pp. x, 112-3.)
Footnote 120: (return)Gardiner: Hist. of the Commonwealth and Protectorate, vol. iii. ch. xlv.; Narrative of Gen. Venables.
Footnote 121: (return)Gardiner: op. cit., iii. p. 368.
Footnote 122: (return)Cf. the "Commission of the Commissioners for the West Indian Expedition." (Narrative of Gen. Venables, p. 109.)
Footnote 123: (return)Cf. American Hist. Review, vol. iv. p. 228; "Instructions unto Gen. Robt. Venables." (Narrative of Gen. Venables, p. 111.)
Footnote 124: (return)Cf. Narrative of Gen. Venables, pp. 3, 90; "Instructions unto Generall Penn," etc., ibid., p. 107.
After the outbreak of the Spanish war, Cromwell was anxious to clear his government of the charges of treachery and violation of international duties. The task was entrusted to the Latin Secretary, John Milton, who on 26th October 1655 published a manifesto defending the actions of the Commonwealth. He gave two principal reasons for the attempt upon the West Indies:—(1) the cruelties of the Spaniards toward the English in America and their depredations on English colonies and trade; (2) the outrageous treatment and extermination of the Indians. He denied the Spanish claims to all of America, either as a papal gift, or by right of discovery alone, or even by right of settlement, and insisted upon both the natural and treaty rights of Englishmen to trade in Spanish seas.
Footnote 125: (return)The memory of the exploits of Drake and his contemporaries was not allowed to die in the first half of the seventeenth century. Books like "Sir Francis Drake Revived," and "The World encompassed by Sir Francis Drake," were printed time and time again. The former was published in 1626 and again two years later; "The World Encompassed" first appeared in 1628 and was reprinted in 1635 and 1653. A quotation from the title-page of the latter may serve to illustrate the temper of the times:—
Drake, Sir Francis. The world encompassed. Being his next voyage to that to Nombre de Dios, formerly imprinted ... offered ... especially for the stirring up of heroick spirits, to benefit their country and eternize their names by like bold attempts. Lon. 1628.Cf. also Gardiner, op. cit., iii. pp. 343-44.
Footnote 126: (return)Gardiner, op. cit., iii. p. 346; cf. also "Present State of Jamaica, 1683."
Footnote 127: (return)Long: "History of Jamaica," i. p. 260; C.S.P. Colon., 1675-76. Addenda, No. 274.
Footnote 128: (return)Long, op. cit., i. p. 272 ff.
Footnote 129: (return)Ibid.; Thurloe Papers, VI. p. 540; vii. p. 260; "Present State of Jamaica, 1683"; C.S.P. Colon., 1675-76. Addenda, Nos. 303-308.
Footnote 130: (return)Long, op. cit., i. p. 245; C.S.P. Colon., 1675-76. Addenda, Nos. 236, 261, 276, etc.
The conditions in Jamaica directly after its capture are in remarkable contrast to what might have been expected after reading the enthusiastic descriptions of the island, its climate, soil and products, left us by Englishmen who visited it. Jackson in 1643 compared it with the Arcadian plains and Thessalien Tempe, and many of his men wanted to remain and live with the Spaniards. See also the description of Jamaica contained in the Rawlinson MSS. and written just after the arrival of the English army:—"As for the country ... more than this." (Narrative of Gen. Venables, pp. 138-9.)
Footnote 131: (return)C.S.P. Colon., 1675-76. Addenda, Nos. 229, 232; Lucas: Historical Geography of the British Colonies, ii. p. 101, and note.
Footnote 132: (return)Lucas, op. cit., ii. p. 109.
Footnote 133: (return)C.S.P. Colon., 1675-76. Addenda, Nos. 230, 231. Fortescue was Gen. Venables' successor in Jamaica.
Footnote 134: (return)Ibid., No. 218; Long, op. cit., i. p. 262.
Footnote 135: (return)C.S.P. Colon., 1675-76. Addenda, Nos. 218, 252; Thurloe Papers, IV. pp. 451, 457.
Footnote 136: (return)Thurloe Papers, IV. pp. 152, 493.
Footnote 137: (return)C.S.P. Colon., 1675-76. Addenda, No. 236.
Footnote 138: (return)Thurloe Papers, IV. p. 604.
Footnote 139: (return)Ibid., pp. 454-5, 604.
Footnote 140: (return)Thurloe Papers, IV. p. 452.
Footnote 141: (return)Ibid., v. pp. 96, 151.
Footnote 142: (return)This was the treasure fleet which Captain Stayner's ship and two other frigates captured off Cadiz on 9th September. Six galleons were captured, sunk or burnt, with no less than £600,000 of gold and silver. The galleons which Blake burnt in the harbour of Santa Cruz, on 20th April 1657, were doubtless the Mexican fleet for which Admiral Goodson vainly waited before Havana in the previous summer.
Footnote 143: (return)C.S.P. Colon., 1675-76, Addenda, Nos. 260, 263, 266, 270, 275; Thurloe Papers, V. p. 340.
Footnote 144: (return)Cf. Brit. Mus., Add. MSS., 12,430: Journal of Col. Beeston. Col. Beeston seems to have harboured a peculiar spite against Doyley. For the contrary view of Doyley, cf. Long, op. cit., i. p. 284.
Footnote 145: (return)C.S.P. Colon., 1675-76. Addenda., Nos. 309, 310. In these letters the towns are called "Tralo" and "St. Mark." Cf. also Thurloe Papers, VII. p. 340.
Footnote 146: (return)Captain Christopher Myngs had been appointed to the "Marston Moor," a frigate of fifty-four guns, in October 1654, and had seen two years' service in the West Indies under Goodson in 1656 and 1657. In May 1656 he took part in the sack of Rio de la Hacha. In July 1657 the "Marston Moor" returned to England and was ordered to be refitted, but by 20th February 1658 Myngs and his frigate were again at Port Royal (C.S.P. Colon., 1675-76, Addenda, Nos. 295, 297). After Admiral Goodson's return to England (Ibid., No. 1202) Myngs seems to have been the chief naval officer in the West Indies, and greatly distinguished himself in his naval actions against the Spaniards.
Footnote 147: (return)Tanner MSS., LI. 82.
Footnote 148: (return)C.S.P. Colon., 1675-76, Addenda, Nos. 315, 316. Some figures put it as high as £500,000.
Footnote 149: (return)C.S.P. Colon., 1675-76, Addenda, Nos. 315, 318. Captain Wm. Dalyson wrote home, on 23rd January 1659/60, that he verily believed if the General (Doyley) were at home to answer for himself, Captain Myngs would be found no better than he is, a proud-speaking vain fool, and a knave in cheating the State and robbing merchants. Ibid., No. 328.
Footnote 150: (return)Ibid., Nos. 327, 331.
Footnote 151: (return)C.S.P. Colon., 1675-76, Addenda, No. 326.
Footnote 152: (return)S.P. Spain, vol. 44, f. 318.
Footnote 153: (return)C.S.P. Colon., 1661-68, Nos. 17, 61.
Footnote 154: (return)C.S.P. Colon., 1661-68, No. 20.
Footnote 155: (return)Ibid., No. 145.
Footnote 156: (return)Ibid., Nos. 259, 278. In Lord Windsor's original instructions of 21st March 1662 he was empowered to search ships suspected of trading with the Spaniards and to adjudicate the same in the Admiralty Court. A fortnight later, however, the King and Council seem to have completely changed their point of view, and this too in spite of the Navigation Laws which prohibited the colonies from trading with any but the mother-country.
Footnote 157: (return)Art. ix. of the treaty. Cf. Dumont: Corps diplomatique, T.V., pt. ii. p. 625. Cf. also C.S.P. Venetian, 1604, p. 189:—"I wished to hear from His Majesty's own lips" (wrote the Venetian ambassador in November 1604), "how he read the clause about the India navigation, and I said, 'Sire, your subjects may trade with Spain and Flanders but not with the Indies.' 'Why not?' said the King. 'Because,' I replied, 'the clause is read in that sense.' 'They are making a great error, whoever they are that hold this view,' said His Majesty; 'the meaning is quite clear.'"
Footnote 158: (return)S.P. Spain, vol. 35.
Footnote 159: (return)C.S.P. Colon., 1661-68, No. 61.
Footnote 160: (return)Ibid., No. 259.
Footnote 161: (return)Ibid., No. 355.
Footnote 162: (return)Ibid., No. 364.
Footnote 163: (return)Thurloe Papers, IV. p. 154.
Footnote 164: (return)Thurloe Papers, IV. p. 457.
Footnote 165: (return)Beeston's Journal.
Footnote 166: (return)Calendar of the Heathcote MSS. (pr. by Hist. MSS. Commiss.), p. 34.
Footnote 167: (return)Calendar of the Heathcote MSS., p. 34. Cf. also C.S.P. Colon., 1661-68, No. 384:—"An act for the sale of five copper guns taken at St. Jago de Cuba."
Footnote 168: (return)Beeston's Journal.
Footnote 169: (return)S.P. Spain, vol. 46.
Footnote 170: (return)Ibid., vol. 47.
Footnote 171: (return)C.S.P. Colon., 1661-68, Nos. 294, 375.
Footnote 172: (return)Brit. Mus., Add. MSS., 11,410, f. 16.
Footnote 173: (return)Ibid., f. 6.
Footnote 174: (return)Dampier also says of Campeache that "it makes a fine show, being built all with good stone ... the roofs flattish after the Spanish fashion, and covered with pantile."—Ed. 1906, ii. p. 147.
Footnote 175: (return)However, the writer of the "Present State of Jamaica" says (p. 39) that Myngs got no great plunder, neither at Campeache nor at St. Jago.
Footnote 176: (return)Beeston's Journal; Brit. Mus., Add. MSS., 13,964, f. 16:—"Original letter from the Licentiate Maldonado de Aldana to Don Francisco Calderon y Romero, giving him an account of the taking of Campeache in 1663"; dated Campeache, March 1663.
According to the Spanish relation there were fourteen vessels in the English fleet, one large ship of forty-four guns (the "Centurion"?) and thirteen smaller ones. The discrepancy in the numbers of the fleet may be explained by the probability that other Jamaican privateering vessels joined it after its departure from Port Royal. Beeston writes in his Journal that the privateer "Blessing," Captain Mitchell, commander, brought news on 28th February that the Spaniards in Campeache had notice from St. Jago of the English design and made elaborate preparations for the defence of the town. This is contradicted by the Spanish report, in which it appears that the authorities in Campeache had been culpably negligent in not maintaining the defences with men, powder or provisions.
Footnote 177: (return)S.P. Spain, vol. 46. Fanshaw to Sec. Bennet, 13th-23rd July 1664.
Footnote 178: (return)Ibid., vol. 45. Letter of Consul Rumbold, 31st March 1663.
Footnote 179: (return)Ibid., 4th May 1663.
Footnote 180: (return)C.S.P. Colon., 1661-68, No. 443. Dated 28th April 1663.
Footnote 181: (return)Ibid., Nos. 441, 442.
Footnote 182: (return)Rawlinson MSS., A. 347, f. 62.
Footnote 183: (return)Beeston's Journal.
Footnote 184: (return) C.S.P. Colon., 1661-68, No. 571; Beeston's Journal.
Footnote 185: (return)S.P. Spain, vol. 46, ff. 94, 96, 108, 121, 123, 127, 309 (April-August 1664).
Footnote 186: (return)C.S.P. Colon., 1661-68, Nos. 697, 744, 812.
Footnote 187: (return)S.P. Spain, vol. 46, f. 280.
Footnote 188: (return)S.P. Spain, vol. 46, f. 311.
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